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We suggest a subtle, yet far-reaching, tension in the objectives specified by the Monetary 
Control Act of 1980 (MCA) for the Federal Reserve’s role in providing retail payment services, 
such as check processing.  Specifically, we argue that the requirement of an overall cost-revenue 
match, coupled with the goal of ensuring equitable access on a universal basis, partially shifted 
the burden of cost recovery from high-cost to low-cost service points during the MCA’s early 
years, thereby allowing private-sector competitors to enter the low-cost segment of the market 
and undercut the relatively uniform prices charged by the Fed.  To illustrate this conflict, we 
develop a voter model for what begins as a monopoly setting in which a regulatory regime that 
establishes a uniform price irrespective of cost differences, and restricts total profits to zero, 
initially dominates through majority rule both deregulation and regulation that sets price equal to 
cost on a bank-by-bank basis.  Uniform pricing is dropped in this model once cream skimming 
has subsumed half the market.  These results help illumine the Federal Reserve’s experience in 
retail payments under the MCA, particularly the movement over time to a less uniform fee 
structure for check processing. 
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Reserve System.  The Monetary Control Act of 1980 (MCA) required the Federal Reserve (Fed) to 
provide all banks with equal access to payment services, not just member banks, and to 
price those services with explicit fees.  The legislative history of the MCA suggests this 
mandate had the twin purpose of promoting competition in the provision of payment 
services and generating revenue for the Treasury. 
  We analyze the interplay between two of the MCA’s most salient features in the 
area of retail payment services.  The first is the requirement that the fees charged for Fed 
services should in total cover both the costs of providing those services and an adjustment 
factor designed to reflect the taxes that would have been paid and the return on capital 
that would have been generated had the services been provided in the private sector.  The 
second is the requirement that, in setting its prices, the Fed should strive to ensure that an 
adequate level of payment services is provided nationwide.  This latter provision suggests 
the Fed may need to set prices for payment services in some regions below the cost to 
provide those services, if necessary to ensure equitable access for banks in all areas of the 
country. 
  We contend these two requirements are inconsistent, essentially promoting, if not 
entailing, a partial shift in the burden of cost recovery from high-cost to low-cost service 
points, thereby allowing private-sector competitors to enter the low-cost segments of the 
market and undercut the relatively uniform prices charged by the Fed.  To clarify the 
ultimate implications of this legislative environment, we develop a voter model for what 
begins as a monopoly setting in which a regulatory regime that establishes a uniform 
price irrespective of cost differences, and restricts total profits to zero, initially dominates 
through majority rule both deregulation and regulation that sets price equal to cost on a  
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bank-by-bank basis.  The uniform price rule is dropped in this model once cream 
skimming has subsumed half the market, and the alternative regulatory regime that 
ensures the equality for individual banks of service fees and costs is never selected by the 
voting mechanism. 
These results suggest the MCA set the stage for a declining role of the Fed as a 
provider of retail payment services, including check processing, and the losses in Fed 
check volume that began in the early 1990s may have reflected the provision of universal 
access, in addition to private sector competition, as heightened by structural change.
1  
Our model then points to the increasing complexity of the Fed’s fee structure as a 
relaxation of, but not departure from, the universal service objective, necessitated by the 
tension between universal service and cost recovery.   
We proceed as follows.  The first section provides an account and interpretation 
of the MCA’s relevant provisions.  In the second section, we develop a voter model of 
payment services regulation.  The third section offers empirical support for our 
arguments in the area of check processing.  The fourth section concludes. 
 
1.  Pricing Provisions of the MCA 
1.1  Cost Recovery   
The MCA required the Fed to establish a fee structure for payment services that 
recovered not only its overall direct and indirect operating costs, but also any additional 
                                                 
1 Regarding structural change, Stavins (2004) suggests that declining Fed check volume in 1994 partly 
reflected the introduction of same-day settlement.  The same-day settlement rule allowed correspondent 
banks to compete more effectively with the Federal Reserve Banks.  
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costs faced by private sector providers of retail payment services.
2  These additional costs 
are imputed through a private sector adjustment factor designed to reflect the taxes that 
would have been paid and the return on capital that would have been generated had the 
services been provided in the private sector.
3   In this manner, MCA was intended to 
promote private sector competition in check collection and other payment services 
provided by the Fed.
4 
1.2  Universal Service  
Along with the requirement that the Fed cover costs with revenue, the MCA also 
included in Section 107 a universal service objective directing the Fed to adopt pricing 
principles that “give due regard to competitive factors and the provision of an adequate 
level of such services nationwide.”  This latter provision suggests the Fed may need to set 
prices for payment services in some regions below the cost of providing them.     
  While this universal service objective is subject to a greater amount of 
interpretation than the relatively straightforward requirement that revenues cover costs, 
its spirit is nevertheless fairly clear.  And, that spirit is reflected in the Fed’s description 
of it business practices, as published in Federal Reserve Regulatory Service 7−137,   
“Federal Reserve services will be offered on a fair and equitable basis to all depository 
institutions on similar terms and conditions.”  Similarly, as stated in Federal Reserve 
                                                 
2 The MCA specified that “over the long run, fees shall be established on the basis of all direct and indirect 
costs actually incurred.”  In practice, the Board of Governors has set fees with the goal of covering costs on 
a year-by-year basis (Federal Reserve Regulatory Service, 7−135). 
3 See Federal Reserve Regulatory Service, 7−147 for a description of the accounting system used to 
calculate the costs associated with the Fed’s provision of payment services. 
4 The MCA specified the following services as requiring explicit fees:  currency and coin, check clearing 
and collection, wire transfer, automated clearinghouse, settlement, securities safekeeping, float, and any 
additional services initiated after the MCA was passed.      
  4 
Regulatory Service 7−143, “Federal Reserve payment services are available to all 
depository institutions, including smaller institutions in remote locations that other 
providers might choose not to serve.” 
In this manner, the MCA’s universal service objective entails the provision of 
payment services for all depository institutions, including smaller institutions in remote 
locations, where volumes are typically low and costs are high.  In addition, the MCA’s 
emphasis on fairness, equity, and inclusiveness may be interpreted as encouraging a 
tendency toward charging relatively uniform prices for these services, even if significant 
differences in costs exist between different users, as indicated in Federal Reserve 
Regulatory Service 7−137, as cited above. 
1.3  Potential Price Undercutting 
However, with the mandate in place for the Fed to match overall cost and revenue 
in providing payment services, its ability to partially shift costs away from high-cost 
users depends on its ability to set fees for low-cost users in excess of the levels associated 
with the recovery of costs for that user category.  As a result, through its universal service 
objective, the MCA may have done more than simply promote private sector competition 
in the provision of payment services.  Rather, it potentially exposed the Fed to price 
undercutting by competition focused on low-cost users.   
These considerations are relevant to the Fed’s role in check processing and other 
areas of payment services as well.  A useful example is documented in the policy 
discussions surrounding the implementation of the MCA in the area of currency and coin 
transportation.  The Fed’s original proposal for pricing principles and a schedule of fees 
(Federal Register, 1980) included the following statement:  
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To assure that the public serviced by institutions in more remote locations receive an adequate 
level of service, the proposed prices for transportation to depository institutions located in more 
remote areas (over-the-road endpoints) have a ceiling imposed for the per stop portion of the cash 
transportation charge.  The proposed price to mail endpoints has the same ceiling.  In the proposed 
pricing structure, the ceiling is set at $32. 
 
The MCA’s universal service objective is clearly manifested in the Fed’s original 
proposal for the pricing of currency and coin transportation.  The total transportation 
charge consisted of a volume charge and charge per stop, the latter of which varied by 
zone.  The proposed $32 cap on the per stop charge most likely amounted to a cost shift 
in favor of institutions located in remote areas.   
But the tension in this context between the provision of universal service and the 
MCA’s cost recovery mandate came to light early in the public comments received by the 
Board of Governors on the proposed fee schedule.  In reviewing the comments received, 
the Fed noted the following concern (Federal Register, 1981): 
Several commentators also were concerned that full cost recovery for these services would result 
in significant increases in charges for rural and remote endpoint deliveries as urban institutions 
drop the services. 
 
These commentators apparently anticipated that the price relief for rural areas would, 
under full cost recovery, necessitate prices above cost for urban areas and thereby open 
the door for bypass and cream skimming.
5  Consistent with this interpretation, the final 
fee schedule for currency and coin transportation that became effective in January of 
1982 established a $75 ceiling on the per stop charge, significantly higher than the $32 
cap initially proposed by the Fed (Federal Reserve Bulletin, 1981).  It turned out that 
                                                 
5 Because the Fed paid private couriers to provide it with currency and coin transportation services, bypass 
would involve an institution establishing a direct relationship with a courier at a lower price than the price 
charged for the indirect relationship provided through the Fed.  
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financial institutions generally established their own transportation arrangements once the 
Fed prices became effective. 
 
2.  The Model 
The following develops a voter model of payment system regulation.  We couch 
the political economy aspects of our model in terms of voting behavior in appreciation of 
the influence of individual banks on regulatory policy, both through the legislative 
process and, perhaps more importantly, through the process of public comment that 
accompanies significant regulatory changes.     
2.1  Consumers 
  A population of financial institutions, referred to here as consumers, is assumed 
with perfectly inelastic demand for a particular payment service, S.  A wealth constraint 
places an upper limit on price.  The notion of a fundamentally necessary service 
motivates the assumption of inelastic demand. 
2.2  Firms 
 Let  0  ≤ c ≤ 1 denote the cost of providing S to individual consumers, with 
cumulative density function F(c) and f = F′.  Attention generally is restricted to strictly 
concave, linear, and strictly convex functions.  Fixed costs are not considered explicitly.
6  
In the monopoly case, technological or regulatory constraints lead to a sole provider.  In 
                                                 
6 For simplicity, and also to isolate cross-subsidization, we consider only attributable costs and not common 
costs.  While not a subsidy in economic terms, the allocation of fixed costs could also yield prices that 
potentially result in cream skimming.  
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an alternative case, perfect competition is introduced to the low-cost segment of the 
industry (c ≤ c
l).  The model then becomes one of undercutting and limited monopoly. 
2.3  Regulation 
Regulation emerges as a way to affect P
s, the price of S.  Under social regulation, 
all consumers are charged the same price (P
s = P*), even when the cost of providing the 
service varies, and the monopolist is restricted to earn zero economic profits overall.  The 
associated per capita administrative costs are denoted as δ.  An alternative, which we 
refer to as marginal cost regulation, sets price equal to cost on a consumer-by-consumer 
basis (P
s = c), also at the per capita cost of δ.  A third policy option is no regulation at all. 
The wealth constraint is specified so as to ensure each of the policy options is 
technically feasible.  In particular, each consumer’s initial endowment is equal to 
max(c) + δ = 1 + δ.  
2.4  Politics 
Consumers assume a political role as voters.  In this role, they determine the form 
of regulation.  In voting for policy alternatives, consumers seek to minimize the cost of S 
and thereby maximize end-of-period wealth.  Majority rule is assumed, so that a policy 
alternative prevails when it receives more than one half of the vote.  If no alternative 
prevails in the first vote, then the two alternatives with the most votes enter a runoff.  The 
proportions of the population with first-best choices of P
s = P*, P
s = c, and no regulation 
are denoted as V
P*,  V
C,  and V
NR, respectively. 
2.5  The Monopoly Case  
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Suppose c
l = 0 and social regulation (P
s = P*) successfully requires the 
monopolist to charge the same price to all consumers, while earning zero economic 
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Consumers for whom P* > c  pay a higher than competitive price.  If these consumers 
could obtain the service at competitive prices from an alternative provider, then they 
would exit the regulated system.     
 
Proposition 1:  When c
l = 0, social regulation occurs if and only if F is strictly 
convex. 
 
Proof:  When c
l = 0, V
P* = 1 – F(P*), V
C = F(P*), and social regulation occurs if and 
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Integration by parts for the left side of (3) gives 0.5.  Hence, F(P*) < 0.5.  When F is 
strictly concave, the inequality in (3) is reversed, so that F(P*) > 0.5.  Linearity implies 
F(P*) = 0.5. 
2.6  Monopoly with Undercutting  
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Now suppose new technology or a reduction of regulatory constraints allows low-
cost consumers (c ≤ c
l) to purchase the service at marginal cost from someone other than 
the former monopolist, so that competitors undercut the regulated price and “cherry-pick” 
in the low-cost (high-profit) areas of the market.  As low-cost consumers bypass the 
regulated system, the social regulatory constraint covering those remaining becomes 
∫ = −
1
. 0 ) ( ) * (
l c
c dF c P                        ( 4 )  
 
Proposition 2:  When c





   
Proof:  When c
l > 0, V
P* = 1 – F(P*),  V
C = F(P*) – F(c
l), and V
NR = F(c
l).  If F(P*) < 
0.5, then over half the population is characterized by c > P*, and V




NR ≥ 0.5.  If V
C = F(P*) – F(c
l)  > 0.5 or V
NR = F(c
l) > 0.5, then the 
corresponding policy alternative prevails.  If V
C ≤ 0.5 and V




P*, then the regulatory option of P
s = c and the no-regulation option enter a runoff.  
Because consumers who had voted for social regulation in the initial vote would now 
band together with the supporters of marginal cost regulation, the regulatory regime with 
P
s = c prevails.  If min(V
NR, V
P*) ≥ V
C, then consumers who had voted for marginal cost 
regulation in the initial vote would band together with the supporters of social regulation, 
and the regulatory regime with P
s = P* prevails.  If min(V
P*, V
C) ≥ V
NR, then consumers 
who had voted for no regulation in the initial vote do not participate in the runoff, as they  
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have no stake in its outcome.  As a result, max(V
P*, V
C ) determines the regulatory 
regime.  
2.7  Deregulation 
  What is the effect of undercutting on the viability of social regulation?  Extensive 
undercutting (V
NR > .5) leads to complete deregulation, as shown in the proof of Prop. 2.  
However, whether or not undercutting has the capacity to induce a shift to the alternative 
regulatory regime (P
s = c) before this point remains to be seen.  If not, then once social 
regulation is established in equilibrium under monopoly, increases in undercutting 
associated with rising competition in the low-cost segments of the market eventually lead 
to complete deregulation, and marginal cost regulation never emerges.  In this case, 
relatively long lags may occur between the inception of competitive pressures and the 
dissolution of social regulation. 
 
Proposition 3:  An increase in c
l leads to an increase in P* if and only if f(c
l) > 0. 
  By pushing up P*, increases in c
l reduce support for social regulation, since V
P* = 
1 – F(P*).  However, as shown in Prop. 2, this effect cannot precipitate the dissolution of 
social regulation prior to the point when F(c
l) > 0.5 unless it causes V
C to exceed V
P*.  
Because P* rises, bypass hurts those consumers remaining in the regulated system.  This 
result for universal service regulation contrasts with the more general regulatory context 
analyzed by Laffont and Tirole (1990), where the effect of bypass on low demand 
customers is ambiguous. 
  
Proof:  (4) implicitly defines P* as a function of c
l.  The implied relationship is   
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), ( ) * (
* l l
l c h c P
dc
dP
− =                        ( 5 )  
where h(c
l) denotes the hazard rate.  Because P* > c
l, (5) is positive when h(c
l) > 0, 
indicating that the regulated price must rise as low-cost consumers exit the system.      
 
Proposition 4:  If F is strictly convex, marginal cost regulation never occurs. 
 
 Proof:  By Prop. 1, social regulation occurs when c
l = 0.  When F(c
l) > 0.5, deregulation 
occurs.  By Prop. 2, if 0< F(c
l) ≤ 0.5, then social regulation occurs if and only if V
P* > V
C 
⇒ 1 − F(P*) > F(P*) − F(c
l).  Let F*(c) = [F(c) – F(c
l)]/[1 − F(c
l)] and f*(c) = f(c) / [1 − 
F(c
l)].  For c
l > 0, 
∫ =
1
. ) ( * *
l c
dc c cf P                                  (6) 
Since F is strictly convex, F* must be also, and Jensen’s inequality implies 
∫ >
1
*). ( * ) ( * ) ( *
l c
P F dc c f c F                     (7) 
Integration by parts for the left side of (7) gives 0.5, so that F*(P*) < 0.5.  Rearranging 
terms gives 1 − F(P*) > F(P*) − F(c
l). 
2.8 Strategic Voting 
  The discussion above entertains switching of voting blocks to second best 
outcomes in the context of runoffs, but leaves unconsidered true strategic voting [see 
Eckel and Holt (1989)], by which consumers vote for second best alternatives in the first 
round with the purpose of influencing second round results.  Below we show this form of 
strategic voting does not arise in our model.  
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  Under the assumption that voters cannot coordinate to split their votes among 
several alternatives, there is no gain to strategic voting in our model.  Voters who prefer 
no regulation are indifferent between social regulation and marginal cost regulation, and 
so obviously have no incentive to vote strategically.  Those who prefer marginal cost 
regulation over the other alternatives also prefer social regulation over no regulation.  
They would not want to vote for no regulation in the first round; and they would have no 
incentive to vote for social regulation either, since in any event max(V
P*, V
C ) would 
determine the outcome in the second round, given V
NR ≤ .5.  The same argument applies 
to voters preferring social regulation.     
 
3.  The Case of Check Processing 
  Our model of regulation entails clear predictions for the Fed’s experience in check 
processing under the MCA, and these predictions are consistent with broad trends in 
various check-related data.    
3.1  Model Predictions for Fed Check Pricing Under the MCA  
 We would expect the MCA’s universal service objective initially to promote a 
relatively flat fee schedule, in parallel with the model’s social regulation regime.  The 
added element of the MCA’s cost recovery mandate would then be expected to foster 
entry by alternative check processors specializing in delivery to low-cost presentment 
points, in parallel with the vulnerability of the model’s social regulation regime to price 
undercutting.  That is, the cost shifting implied by the combination of a relatively flat fee 
structure and full cost recovery would be expected over time to give rise to bypass of the 
Fed in the provision of check processing services directed toward low-cost presentment  
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points.  Such bypass, in turn, would eventually pressure the Fed to price in closer 
accordance with the varying costs associated with the geographic locations of different 
presentment points, thereby relaxing, while not departing from, the MCA’s universal 
service objective, in a manner similar to the eventual deregulation occurring within the 
model. 
3.2  Trends in Fed Check Pricing 
Given the MCA’s universal service objective and its emphasis on small 
institutions located in remote areas, we expect the Fed would have designed its fee 
structure for check processing so as to promote the provision of check processing 
services for rural institutions.  And there is anecdotal support for this view.  In forums 
hosted by the Rivlin Committee in the mid-nineties, a taskforce designed to assess the 
role of the Fed in providing retail payment services, private-sector participants expressed 
the view that small remote institutions would face higher prices for check processing if 
the Fed were to exit the business (Committee on the Federal Reserve in the Payments 
Mechanism, 1997). 
In this regard, given the relatively low volumes and greater geographic distances 
associated with rural presentment points, it seems safe to assume that incremental costs 
are relatively high for the presentment of checks to institutions located in rural areas.  
Given the higher costs associated with rural presentment, an approximately flat fee 
schedule would imply that rural presentment was priced lower relative to costs than urban 
presentment.  Therefore, if the fee schedule was approximately flat, rural banks would 
benefit from Fed participation, as the Rivlin Committee found, if rural banks depend 
more heavily on rural presentment than urban banks.  Even considerable geographic  
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differentiation in pricing could be consistent with the view that rural institutions are more 
dependent on rural presentment and benefit from Fed cost shifting, so long as the 
differentiation does not fully compensate for underlying geographic differentials in 
incremental cost. 
Supporting the view that rural institutions depend more heavily on rural 
presentment, the fees charged by the Reserve Banks for check processing services were 
fairly uniform in the early years of the MCA.  While early on a higher fee was already 
charged for presentment in a remote location, over time the degree and complexity of 
geographic differentiation increased substantially. 
As of 1990, only two Reserve Banks⎯Kansas City and Minneapolis⎯used a 
tiered fee schedule, whereby different prices were set for low- and high-cost presentment 
points within the same check collection zone, as shown in Table 1.  The Federal Reserve 
Board approved tiered pricing as a permanent fee structure for these offices in 1986 and 
specified as one of the criteria for the adoption of tiered pricing at other offices the 
requirement that clear cost differences exist between groups of presentment points within 
the check collection zone under consideration.
7  By 1998, all the Reserve Banks except 
Atlanta and Dallas had moved to a tiered fee structure within Regional Check Processing 
Center (RCPC) zones.
8  Today, the pricing of check services is far more differentiated 
                                                 
7 For a brief history of the advent of tiered pricing, along with a statement of the associated criteria 
established by the Federal Reserve Board, see the Federal Register, 1990. 
8 The Kansas City Reserve Bank did not employ an RCPC zone, but used tiered pricing in its country zone, 
as shown in Table 1.  RCPC zones are designated areas within the territories of Federal Reserve offices, but 
outside Federal Reserve cities.  Country zones generally are exterior to RCPC zones.  Of the five Reserve 
Banks that designated country zones in both 1990 and 1998, four employed a flat country zone fee, rather 
than a tiered price.  Each of these four Reserve Banks raised the country zone fee from 1990 to 1998.  
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than in 1998.
9  Assuming each of these movements to tiered pricing satisfied the Federal 
Reserve Board’s requirement that clear cost differences should exist within check 
collection zones, we can infer that prior to the move to tiered pricing a constant price had 
been charged across endpoints with significantly different costs. 
In addition, several other features of the Fed’s fee schedule for check collection 
services also conform to the model’s implications.  Interestingly, in many cases the move 
to tiered pricing in RCPC zones was accompanied by a reduction in prices in the 
corresponding city zones.  Moreover, four Reserve Banks moved to tiered pricing in the 
city zone as well.  These events are consistent with our view that heated competition and 
cream skimming focused on high-volume low-cost presentment points led the Fed to 
reduce over time the degree of cost shifting associated with the universal service 
objective of the MCA.  Other features of the fees charged for check clearing services, 
such as the emergence of volume discounts, also conform to our theory. 
3.3  An Alternative View 
Our perspective takes on increased importance in light of the controversy 
surrounding the prices charged by the Fed for retail payment services.  Lacker and 
Weinberg (1998) argue that that the movement toward greater differentiation in check 
processing fees might reflect certain legal privileges bestowed upon the Fed.  In 
particular, Reserve Banks can present checks to a paying bank until 2:00 p.m. and still 
receive payment the same day, whereas private-sector participants must present by 8:00 
a.m. in order to insist on same-day funds.  For relatively remote presentment where 
                                                 
9 For more details regarding pricing of Federal Reserve check services, see 
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transportation time is significant, the six-hour monopoly enjoyed by the Fed could 
represent a significant competitive advantage.  The possibility then arises that the 
increasing differentials observed in the Fed’s pricing structure might reflect efforts to 
shift costs to protected market segments for presentment in rural areas, thereby leaving 
room to maintain relatively low fees in the more closely contested city markets.   
In support of our view that a good part of the observed changes in fees reflects 
underlying cost differentials, we have pointed to the relatively flat cost structure that 
initially was adopted under MCA, together with the Board’s requirement that the 
adoption of tiered pricing at the Reserve Bank offices must be supported by the 
demonstration of clear cost differences between groups of presentment points.  Assuming 
the widespread movement to tiered pricing satisfied the Federal Reserve Board’s 
requirement that clear cost differences should exist within check collection zones, we can 
infer that prior to the move to tiered pricing a constant price had been charged across 
endpoints with significantly different costs.  Moreover, squaring the alternative view that 
prices for rural presentment have been set artificially high with the findings of the Rivlin 
Committee that the Fed followed the universal service objective by favoring rural 
institutions would require that rural institutions actually tend to present a lower share of 
their collected checks to rural institutions than do their urban counterparts. 
In summary, our analysis suggests costs historically were partially shifted to city 
presentment, but then over time were aligned more closely with underlying cost 
differentials for rural presentment, whereas Lacker and Weinberg focus on the possibility 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.frbservices.org/FeeSchedules/index.html.  
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that changes in prices have gone beyond this point, so that now costs actually are partially 
shifted to rural presentment.  While we cannot rule out this possibility, our findings are 
nevertheless significant, in that they show that at least part, if not all, of the movement 
toward greater complexity and geographic differentiation in prices could be expected as a 
natural outcome of the MCA. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
Our analysis supports the view that the Fed’s movement away from its initial 
relatively flat fee structure for check processing to a less uniform schedule reflects to a 
significant degree an effort to curtail undercutting and cream skimming by pricing access 
in closer accordance with geographically determined costs, ultimately reflecting a 
resolution of the underlying tension between the MCA’s cost recovery and universal 
service provisions. 
The universal service objective is no longer politically supported in our model 
once cream skimming has subsumed half the market, while the alternative regulatory 
regime that ensures the equality for individual banks of service fees and costs is never 
selected by the voting mechanism.  These results from our model suggest the MCA’s 
universal service provision, while still in effect, may continue to become a less prominent 
feature of the Fed’s role in retail payments.  At the same time, other potential motivations 
for the Fed’s presence as a provider of retail payment services, not considered directly in 
our model, may come to have greater visibility.  
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Table 1 
Check Processing Fees for Federal Reserve Cities and  
Associated Regional Check Processing Centers (RCPCs), Cents per Item 
1 
 
 City  RCPC 
2 













































































































































1 The fee data are taken from the Interdistrict Check Manual, 1990 and 1998.  Where only one price is 
shown, the processing bank charged a single price for all checks within the zone; where multiple prices are 
shown, the processing bank charged a tiered price.  The total fee for check processing also includes a cash 
letter fee, which is not shown above.  Prices shown are for “unsorted regular” cash letters. 
2 RCPC zones are designated areas within the territories of Federal Reserve offices but outside Federal 
Reserve cities.  
3 Because the Kansas City territory did not employ an RCPC zone, prices for country zone items are shown 
instead. 
4 Checks for New York were processed at East Rutherford, NJ or Jericho, NY.  
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